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Abstract Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is a
popular safety and reliability analysis tool in examining
potential failures of products, process, designs, or services,
in a wide range of industries. While FMEA is a popular
tool, the limitations of the traditional Risk Priority Number
(RPN) model in FMEA have been highlighted in the lit-
erature. Even though many alternatives to the traditional
RPN model have been proposed, there are not many
investigations on the use of clustering techniques in
FMEA. The main aim of this paper was to examine the use
of a new Euclidean distance-based similarity measure and
an incremental-learning clustering model, i.e., fuzzy
adaptive resonance theory neural network, for similarity
analysis and clustering of failure modes in FMEA; there-
fore, allowing the failure modes to be analyzed, visualized,
and clustered. In this paper, the concept of a risk interval
encompassing a group of failure modes is investigated.
Besides that, a new approach to analyze risk ordering of
different failure groups is introduced. These proposed
methods are evaluated using a case study related to the
edible bird nest industry in Sarawak, Malaysia. In short, the
contributions of this paper are threefold: (1) a new
Euclidean distance-based similarity measure, (2) a new risk
interval measure for a group of failure modes, and (3) a
new analysis of risk ordering of different failure groups.
Keywords Failure mode and effect analysis 
Fuzzy ART  Similarity measure  Risk interval measure 
Risk ordering
1 Introduction
Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is a popular and
effective problem prevention methodology for defining,
identifying, and eliminating potential failures and errors of
a system, design, process, or service [1]. A search in the
literature reveals that FMEA has been used in a wide
variety of application domains, e.g., aerospace [2], auto-
motive [1], nuclear [3], electronic [4], manufacturing [5],
chemical [6], mechanical [7], health care and hospital [8–
10], agriculture [11, 12], and ocean engineering [13, 14].
The main usefulness of FMEA is to identify potential
failure modes of a system, understand the causes and
effects of each potential failure mode, and determine
actions to eliminate or reduce the risk of failure modes [1].
Traditionally, the risk of a failure mode is determined by
computing the Risk Priority Number (RPN) [1]. The RPN
model considers three factors as its inputs, i.e., severity (S),
occurrence (O), and detect (D), and produces an RPN score
(i.e., multiplication of S, O, and D) as the output [1]. S and
O are seriousness and frequency of a failure mode,
respectively, while D is the effectiveness of the existing
measures in detecting a failure before the failure effect
reaches the customer [1].
Regardless of the popularity of FMEA, the use of the tra-
ditional RPN model in FMEA is arguable [2, 15]. In [15], a
review of various risk evaluation methods as alternatives to the
traditional RPN model was presented. The existing methods
are grouped into five categories, i.e., multi-criteria decision-
making (MCDM) methods, mathematical programming (MP)
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methods, artificial intelligence (AI) methods, integrated
methods, and others. In general, MCDM methods interpret
S, O, and D as the decision criteria (or sub criteria), and
decision alternatives (e.g., causes or failure modes) are
evaluated. Note that S, O, and D scores can be precise or
imprecise. MP methods consider S, O, and D scores to be
precise, or more often imprecise (represented as fuzzy
sets). More complicated mathematical techniques (e.g.,
fuzzy weighted geometric means, fuzzy ordered weighted
geometric averaging, and fuzzy envelopment analysis) are
used to prioritize the failure modes. AI methods use
intelligent algorithms, e.g., rule base system, fuzzy rule
base system, fuzzy adaptive resonance theory (ART), and
fuzzy cognitive map, in FMEA. The fuzzy rule base system
is one of the most popular methods. Both rule base and
fuzzy rule base systems use ‘‘(fuzzy) If–Then’’ rules to
model the relationship between S, O, D, and RPN. In our
previous work [16–18], we argue that it is important to
maintain the monotonicity relationship between S, O, D,
and RPN scores. The monotonicity relationship is exploited
as a useful qualitative information for RPN modeling using
fuzzy rule base systems. Integrated methods are methods
that attempt to combine more than one methods for risk
evaluation, e.g., a hybrid method comprising the fuzzy rule
base system and fuzzy analytical hierarchical process, and
fuzzy evidential reasoning and gray theory. Example of
others methods are Monte Carlo, cost-based model, and
kano graph [15].
Some of the above-mentioned methods (influenced by
the traditional risk assessment and MCDM practices)
attempt to map S, O, and D scores (either precise or
imprecise) to a common domain for comparison and
ranking. This can be viewed as a mapping or projection of
information from a high-dimensional space to one-dimen-
sional space. Making decision with such methods exploits
the mapped S, O, and D scores, in one (dimensional)
common domain. The use of mapping in FMEA is useful,
as it provides a metric to assess S, O, and D scores.
However, making decision solely based on the mapped S,
O, and D scores can be disadvantageous, as some important
information is lost (i.e., projection from a higher-dimen-
sional space to one-dimensional space) or modified (i.e.,
tuning, optimization, identification, or preprocessing tech-
niques in more complicated risk modeling techniques). In
this paper, the focus is on the use of a clustering technique
for analysis of failure modes in FMEA. It is worth noting
that the use of fuzzy ART in FMEA was examined by
Keskin and Özkan [19], with the reason that different
combinations of S, O, and D could produce the same RPN
scores. In addition to this reason, we further justify the
advantages of using clustering techniques in FMEA in this
paper, as follows: (1) Clustering deals with the original S,
O, and D scores directly; (2) clustering allows failure
modes to be compared, or visualized in the S, O, and
D space as groups of information; and (3) use of the ori-
ginal S, O, and D scores (instead of the mapped S, O, and
D scores into a common domain) avoids loss or modifi-
cation of important information for decision making.
Motivated from the above-mentioned reasons, the main
aim of this paper was to investigate the use of an
Euclidean distance-based similarity measure and an
incremental-learning clustering technique (i.e., fuzzy ART
[20]) for analysis of failure modes in FMEA. The
Euclidean distance-based similarity measure quantifies the
similarity between two failure modes by taking their S, O,
and D scores into consideration. This measure is impor-
tant as it provides a quantity to indicate whether a failure
mode under consideration (represented by its S, O, and
D scores) is similar to others; therefore, serving as a
solution to one of the key issues in FMEA, i.e., different
combinations of S, O, and D can produce the same RPN
scores. As an example, consider two failure modes with S,
O, and D scores of [1 1 10] and [1 10 1]. With the
traditional RPN model, the RPN score of 10 for both
failures is produced. However, with the proposed
Euclidean distance-based similarity measure (as described
in Sect. 3.1), their similarity measure is 0.1835. This
implies that even though both failure modes are associated
with the same RPN score, they can be differentiated by
the similarity measure. It is worth mentioning that the use
of the similarity measure in decision-making problems is
not new, e.g., in perceptual computing, the Jaccard simi-
larity measure was used [21].
In general, clustering is a process of organizing sets of
data samples, which are attributed by multi-dimensional
features, into separate groups based on their similarity [22].
The data samples within a cluster share some similar fea-
tures, as compared to those associated with other clusters
[22]. Examples of popular clustering techniques are k-
means clustering [23], fuzzy ART [20, 24], and fuzzy
c-means [25]. In this paper, the focus is on the use of fuzzy
ART for clustering failure modes in FMEA into different
groups. Fuzzy ART is chosen because of its adaptive and
incremental-learning properties. Besides that, failure
modes should be prioritized. In [19], each group of failure
modes is ranked and prioritized according to its arithmetic
mean. In this paper, the risk of each failure mode is eval-
uated with the (fuzzy) RPN model. Instead of arithmetic
mean, the risk of each group of failure modes is repre-
sented as a risk interval measure, i.e., the minimum and
maximum RPN scores of the failure modes in the group
using the (fuzzy) RPN model. In addition, risk ordering of
different groups of failure modes is analyzed. Such analysis
attempts to provide additional information, i.e., whether the
risk of a group of failure modes is higher than that of
another group of failure modes.
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The contributions of this paper are threefold: (1) an
Euclidean distance-based similarity measure to quantify
the degree of similarity between two failure modes; (2) a
risk interval measure to represent the risk of a group of
failure modes; and (3) a risk ordering analysis for different
groups of failure modes. The Euclidean distance-based
similarity measure provides a measure of ordinary distance
of two failure modes in the S, O, and D space (as in Def-
inition 1). The risk interval measure provides a measure of
risk pertaining to a group of failure modes in the S, O, and
D space. The risk ordering analysis of two groups of failure
modes further indicates whether both groups can be
ordered or one is a subset of another. To evaluate the
proposed method, real-world data and information from
swiftlets farming and edible bird nest (EBN) processing
[11, 12] are used. The experimental results are discussed
and analyzed.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, the tra-
ditional RPN and fuzzy rule base RPN models are
explained. In Sect. 3, the use of fuzzy ART in FMEA and
our proposed methods are described. In Sect. 4, the
experimental results are presented and discussed. Finally,
concluding remarks are provided in Sect. 5.
2 Background
In this section, S, O, D, and RPN are defined. The tradi-
tional RPN and fuzzy rule base RPN model are explained.
2.1 Severity, occurrence, detect, and Risk Priority
Number
Traditionally, FMEA adopts the RPN model, which con-
siders three risk factors, i.e., S, O, and D, for failure mode
analysis and risk prioritization [1]. In this paper, these three
risk factors are defined as the input space, as follows.
Definition 1: An input space, i.e., S 9 O 9 D, is con-
sidered. Variables s, o, and d are the elements of S, O, and
D, respectively, i.e., s 2 S, o 2 O, and d 2 D. The lower
and upper boundaries of S is represented by s and s,
respectively. Similarly, the lower or upper boundaries of O
and D are represented by o and o, as well as d and d,
respectively.
A set of data samples in the S, O, and D space, as
defined in Definition 1, i.e., [s, o, d], are considered.
Traditionally, the risk of [s, o, d] is compared with other
sets of data samples in the RPN space. The RPN space and
RPN are defined as follows.
Definition 2: The RPN space is the output space con-
taining all possible RPN scores, i.e., RPN 2 RPN space.
The lower and upper boundaries of the RPN space is rep-
resented by RPN and RPN, respectively. The RPN space
follows a monotonic, ordered sequence, i.e., the higher the
RPN score, the higher the risk.
2.2 The traditional and fuzzy inference system-based
RPN models
Traditionally, the risk of [s, o, d] is obtained using Eq. 1
and is designated as the RPN score. Equation 1 can be
viewed as a mapping of [s, o, d] to the RPN space.
RPN ¼ s o d ð1Þ
As an alternative to the traditional RPN model, the fuzzy
rule base RPN model was proposed [2, 16–18]. Hereafter,
the fuzzy rule base RPN model is known as the fuzzy
inference system (FIS)-based RPN model. Each S, O, and
D domain is defined using a scale table, with mS, mO, and
mD partitions, respectively. Each partition in the S, O, and
D domains is represented by a fuzzy membership function,
i.e., lnXX xð Þ, and is associated with a linguistic term, i.e.,
AnXX , where nX = 1, 2, 3, …, mX, x 2 [s, o, d] and X 2 [S, O,
D]. Note that the fuzzy membership functions follow an
ordered sequence, i.e., lpXX xð Þ4l
pXþ1
X xð Þ, where pX 2 [1, 2,
3, …, mX - 1]. The relationships between S, O, D, and
RPN are formulated as a set of fuzzy rules, as follows.
RnS;nO;nD : If severity is AnSS and occurrence is A
nO
O and detect
is AnDD , then RPN is B
nS;nO;nD where BnS;nO;nD is the fuzzy
consequence in the RPN space. Note that bnS;nO;nD is the fuzzy
singleton [26] for BnS;nO;nD . With the zero-order Sugeno FIS
model [26], the RPN score is obtained using Eq. 2. To ease
the explanation, the RPN score obtained from the FIS-based
RPN model is called the Fuzzy RPN score, where
Fuzzy RPN 2 RPN space and Definition 2 applies.









S sð Þ  l
nO
O oð Þ  l
nD









S sð Þ  l
nO





3 The proposed methods
In this section, the proposed Euclidean distance-based
similarity measure is firstly formulated. The use of fuzzy
ART for failure modes clustering is presented. The pro-
posed formulations for risk interval and analysis of risk
ordering of failure groups are further explained.
3.1 Euclidean distance-based similarity measure
A set of failure modes, each represented as a data sample in
the S, O, and D space, as defined in Definition 3, is
considered.
Definition 3: A set of data samples with m failure modes
is considered. Each failure mode is denoted as xk ¼
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sk; ok; dk½  in the S, O, and D space (Definition 1),
k ¼ 1; 2; 3; . . .;m.
An Euclidean distance-based similarity measure for two
failure modes is formulated. The similarity measure
between two failure modes, i.e., xk ¼ sk; ok; dk½  and
xj ¼ sj; oj; dj
 







 2þ ok  oj
 2þ dk  dj
 2







Note that Similarity xk; xj
 
¼ Similarity xj; xk
 
. The
higher the similarity measure, the higher the degree of
similarity between xk and xj. If xk ¼ xj,
Similarity xk; xj
 
¼ 1. If xk ¼ s; o; d½  and xj ¼ s; o; d½ ,
vice versus, Similarity xk; xj
 
¼ 0. As an example, if xk ¼
1; 1; 10½  and xj ¼ 1; 10; 1½ , Similarity xk; xj
 
¼ 0:1835.
3.2 Fuzzy ART for clustering of failure modes
The fuzzy ART neural network is adopted for clustering all
failure modes. Each failure mode is fed in sequence, i.e.,
starting from x1, x2, until xm. The architecture of fuzzy
ART is depicted in Fig. 1. In layer 1 (or input layer), there
are 6 nodes, i.e., snor, onor, dnor, snor
c , onor
c , and dnor
c . In layer
2 (or recognition layer), there are s cluster prototypes,
s [ 0, and s can be increased over time depending on the
availability of data samples. Each cluster prototype is
labeled as Cz, where z ¼ 1; 2; 3; . . .; s: The weight con-
necting Cz and xnor is denoted as w
:
xnor;z
. As an example, the
weight connecting C1 and snor is denoted as wsnor;1 and that
connecting Cs and dnor
c is denoted as wcdnor;s . All weights are
contained in a matrix, i.e., Wxnor;z . Each component of Wxnor;z
is labeled as Wxnor;zðvÞ, where v ¼ 1; 2; 3. . .; 6:.
The dynamics of fuzzy ART can be divided into the
following steps.
(i) Normalization and complement coding
(a) Normalize S, O, and D to [0, 1].
(b) Normalize each sk, ok, and dk to [0, 1]
using Eq. (4). Normalized xk is denoted as




x x ; where x 2 s; o; d½  ð4Þ
(c) Perform complement coding [20] of sk,nor,
ok,nor, and dk;nor, i.e., sk,nor
c , ok,nor





¼ 1 xk;nor; where x 2 s; o; d½  ð5Þ
(d) Form the complement-coded failure mode
of xk;nor, i.e., x
c








k;nor. Again, each com-
ponent of xck;nor is labeled as x
c
k;norðvÞ where
v ¼ 1; 2; 3; . . .; 6: As an example,
xck;nor 1ð Þ ¼ sk;nor.
(ii) Parameters setting: The choice (), vigilance
(q), and learning rate (b) parameters are deter-
mined. Among these three parameters, q plays
the key role as it regulates the granularity of the
cluster structures formed in fuzzy ART [20]. In
this paper,  = 0.0001 and b = 1 (i.e., fast
learning) are adopted, while q is varied, with its
effect examined.
(iii) Initialization: The number of cluster is set to 1
(i.e., s = 1), but is incremental as learning
progresses. The weights connecting C1 and x
:
nor
are initialized to 1.
(iv) Category Choice, Test, and Search: Each input
vector (i.e., xck;nor) is transmitted from layer 1 to
layer 2. The response of each node in layer 2 is
computed using the choice function (Eq. 6). The
node that has the highest response, denoted as
node J 2 1; 2; 3; . . .; sð Þ, is selected as the win-
ning node (Eq. 7). If there is a tie on Tk;z, the













TJ ¼ max Tk;z : z ¼ 1; 2; 3; . . .; s
 
ð7Þ
Winning node J propagates its weight vector
back to layer 1. A vigilance test (Eq. 8) is per-





. . . 
Fig. 1 Fuzzy ART architecture, in which layer 2 is an incremental
layer
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vigilance threshold between the transformed














If the vigilance test is satisfied, resonance is said to
occur and learning takes place (the next step).
However, if the vigilance test fails, node J is inhib-
ited, i.e., it is prohibited from participating in sub-
sequent competitions. Input xck;nor is re-transmitted
to layer 2 to search for a new winner. This process is
repeated, consecutively disabling nodes in layer 2,
until either an existing winning node is able to pass
the vigilance test, or, if no such node is available, a
new node is created to encode the input vector.
(v) Learning: Once the search process ends, learning
takes place by adjusting Wxnor;J using Eq. (9).




þ 1 bð ÞWxnor;J;oldðvÞ;where v
¼ 1; 2; 3; . . .; 6 ð9Þ
3.3 Risk interval measure
In this study, the risk of a group of failure modes (xk 2 Cz)
is represented as a risk interval, i.e., RPNz ¼
RPNz;RPNz
h i
. The traditional or FIS-based RPN model
(as explained in Sect. 2.2) is used to obtain the RPN score
of xk ¼ sk; ok; dk½  and is denoted as RPNk. The risk interval
of Cz is obtained using Eqs. (10) and (11).
RPNz ¼ min RPNk; for all xk 2 Czð Þ ð10Þ
RPNz ¼ maxðRPNk; for all xk 2 CzÞ ð11Þ
3.4 Risk ordering
In this study, risk ordering of different failure groups is
analyzed with the risk interval produced from Sect. 3.3.
Consider two failure groups Cz1 and Cz2, where
z1; z2 2 1; 2; 3; . . .; s, with their risk intervals, RPNz1 ¼
RPNz1;RPNz1
h i
and RPNz2 ¼ RPNz2;RPNz2
h i
, respec-
tively. The ordering relationship between RPNz1 and
RPNz2 is summarized in Table 1. If RPNz1\RPNz2 and
RPNz1\RPNz2, then RPNz1 \ RPNz2. If RPNz1 ¼ RPNz2
and RPNz1\RPNz2, then RPNz1 B RPNz2. If RPNz1 ¼
RPNz2 and RPNz1 ¼ RPNz2, then RPNz1 = RPNz2. If
RPNz1 [ RPNz2 and RPNz1\RPNz2, then RPNz1 2 RPNz2
and Cz1 and Cz2 cannot be ordered.
4 A case study
In this section, a case study related to swiftlets farming and
EBN processing is presented. The background of EBN [11]
and its S, O, and D definitions are explained. The experi-
mental results are analyzed and discussed.
4.1 Background of swiftlets farming and edible bird
nest processing
Edible bird nest (or known as ‘‘the Caviar of the East’’) is
the nest of swiftlets, which is consumed as a type of
(healthy) food [27]. With a high demand of EBN from
China, swiftlets farming and EBN processing have emerged
as a popular urban industry among Southeast Asia coun-
tries, including Malaysia [28]. It is worth noting that Sar-
awak and Sabah (two states of Malaysia in the Borneo
Island) are the second ranked resource area (after Indonesia)
of the world for EBN production [11]. Despite the popu-
larity of EBN as a food source, it is challenging to ensure its
quality of EBN processing. Indeed, many activities on
enhancing the quality of EBN have been reported, as
summarized in [11]. EBN production comprises five sub-
processes [11], i.e., (i) swiftlets farming, (ii) harvesting, (iii)
EBN cleaning, (iv) EBN drying and reshaping, and
(v) storing and packaging. The use of FMEA (with FIS-
based RPN) for improving these sub-processes was reported
in [11]. Information and data were gathered from several
swiftlets farms and EBN production plants in Sarawak [11].
Based on the preliminary investigation in [11], we extend
the work using a clustering-based FMEA technique in this
study. Specifically, information and data from [11] are
further analyzed with several proposed methods, as men-
tioned in Sect. 3. Two continuous sub-processes of EBN
production, i.e., EBN cleaning as well as EBN drying and
reshaping, are examined in details, as follows.
4.2 Severity, occurrence, and detect scale tables
The scale tables of S, O, and D are presented in Tables 2, 3
and 4, respectively. In each scale table, column ‘‘Ranking’’
states the score intervals. These intervals are tagged with a
linguistic term, as in column ‘‘Linguistic Term AnXXð Þ’’,
where nX = 1, 2, 3, …, mX and X 2 [S, O, D]. There are mX
intervals for each S, O, and D, respectively. A detailed
description of each interval is summarized in column
‘‘Description’’. As an example, a score from 1 to 2 is
assigned with the linguistic term of ‘‘Very Low’’ for S, i.e.,
AS
1. This interval is used to indicate a failure with a minor
effect, which can be ignored. Besides that, even if the
failure occurs, the yield and the product quality are still
excellent.
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4.3 Results and discussions
4.3.1 Risk evaluation and clustering results
Table 5 summarizes the risk evaluation results with the
traditional and FIS-based RPN models, together with the
clustering results of fuzzy ART. Sub-columns ‘‘k’’ and
‘‘Description’’ are the label and description of a failure
mode, respectively. Columns ‘‘Sev,’’ ‘‘Occ,’’ and ‘‘Det’’
contain the S, O, and D score of each failure mode,
respectively. The risk evaluation results with the traditional
and FIS-based RPN models are presented in columns
‘‘RPN’’ and ‘‘Fuzzy RPN,’’ respectively. Columns Ck are
the clustering results using fuzzy ART with three different
settings of the vigilance parameter, i.e., q = 0.7, 0.9, and
0.95. As an example, the first failure mode (i.e., k = 1) is
described as ‘‘Tearing of raw EBN.’’ Its S, O, and D scores
are 4, 9, and 1, respectively. With the traditional RPN
model (i.e., Eq. (1)) and fuzzy RPN model (i.e., Eq. (2)),
the RPN and fuzzy RPN scores for this failure mode are 36
and 422, respectively. With fuzzy ART, this failure mode
belongs to the first cluster, for the three q settings.
As shown in Table 5, all failure modes are clustered into
1, 3, and 5 groups with q = 0.7, 0.9, and 0.95, respectively.
When q = 0.9, failure modes 1, 3, and 4 belong to the first
group; failure modes 5–13 belong to the second group;
failure mode 2 belongs to the third group. When q = 0.95,
there are five groups. Cluster 1 contains failure mode 1;
cluster 2 contains failure modes 3 and 4; cluster 3 contains
failure modes 6, 7, 11, and 12; cluster 4 contains failure
Table 1 Risk ordering of
RPNz1 and RPNz2
RPNz RPNz1\RPNz2 RPNz1 ¼ RPNz2 RPNz1 [ RPNz2
RPNz
RPNz1\RPNz2 RPNz1 \ RPNz2 RPNz1 B RPNz2 RPNz1 2 RPNz2
RPNz1 ¼ RPNz2 RPNz1 B RPNz2 RPNz1 = RPNz2 RPNz1 C RPNz2
RPNz1 [ RPNz2 RPNz1 3RPNz2 RPNz1 C RPNz2 RPNz1 [ RPNz2




1–2 Very low Effect of the potential failure mode is not obvious and can be ignored
Excellent yield and product quality
3–4 Low Very minor impact to the production yield
Failures cause a minor impact to EBN food production process control. The consequence will cause a minor effect
to the products’ cosmetic appearance and packaging
5–7 Medium Failures lead to the issue of minor security breaches of the farm, and habitat of the swiftlets is affected by some of
the pests and enemies of the swiftlets. The consequence will cause a reduction in the population of the swiftlets
and the yield of the farm
Failures cause a minor impact to the production yield
8–9 High Failures lead to the issue of serious security breaches of the farm. Safety of the swiftlets will be threatened by its
enemies, such as thieves and predators
Failures cause a major impact to the production yield
10 Very high Failures lead to impacts to product safety and quality
Compliance to law
Major impact to the reputation of the company and the products
Lead to failure to yield management
Table 3 Scale table for
occurrence (from [11])
Ranking Linguistic term, AnOO
 
Description
1 Extremely low Failures happen at least once ever
2–3 Very low Failures happen at least once within 6–12 months
4–5 Low Failures happen at least once within 1–6 months
6–7 Medium Failures happen at least once within 1–30 days
8–9 High Failures happen at least once within 1–8 working hours
10 Very high Failures happen many times within an hour
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modes 5, 8, 9, 10, and 13; and cluster 5 contains failure
mode 2.
4.3.2 Similarity measures among failure modes
The similarity measures among all failure modes in
Table 5 are obtained using the proposed Euclidean dis-
tance-based similarity measure (i.e., Eq. (3)). The results
are shown in Table 6. As an example, for j; k ¼ 1,
Similarity x1; x1ð Þ ¼ 1. Similarity between the first and
second failure modes can be obtained by setting j = 1,
k = 2, i.e., Similarity x2; x1ð Þ = 0.79714 (as shaded in
Table 6). From Table 6, the minimum and maximum
similarity measures are 0.7971 and 1, respectively. These
failure modes are close to each other in the
S 9 O 9 D space.
Table 4 Scale table for detect (from [11])
Ranking Linguistic term, AnDDð Þ Description
1–3 Very high Detection is excellent
Control actions can almost detect the failure on the spot and appropriate actions are taken to solve
the failure and the weakness.
Prevent the excursion from occurring
4–6 High Detection is good
Control actions can almost detect the failure on the spot within the same process module or steps
In farm management, control actions can detect the failure within 1 day
Appropriate actions are available to solve the failure and the weakness
7–8 Medium Detection is acceptable
Control actions can detect the failure within one to two process modules or steps
In farm management, control actions can detect the failure within one to three days
Appropriate actions are available. However, the failure can be tricky and hard to solve
9 Low Hard to detect
Control actions may not detect the failure
Appropriate actions may not be available and the failure cannot be solved
10 Very low Detection is almost impossible
No control action is available
No solution is available for solving the failure
Table 5 Risk evaluation and clustering results of failure modes
Failure mode Sev Occ Det RPN Fuzzy RPN
(from [11])
Ck
k Description q = 0.7 q = 0.9 q = 0.95
1 Tearing of raw EBN 4 9 1 36 422 1 1 1
2 Dissolution of EBN 4 6 2 48 339 1 3 5
3 Dirty EBN 3 10 1 30 447 1 1 2
4 Tearing of raw EBN 4 10 1 40 465 1 1 2
5 EBN is not dry enough for the reshaping process 3 7 4 84 532 1 2 4
6 Spraying is uneven 4 7 4 112 549 1 2 3
7 Cracking of the EBN 4 8 4 128 591 1 2 3
8 Cracking of the EBN
Too much gaps
3 8 4 96 574 1 2 4
9 Failure in molding 3 8 4 96 574 1 2 4
10 EBN is too dry 3 7 4 84 532 1 2 4
11 Spraying is uneven 4 7 4 112 549 1 2 3
12 Cracking of the EBN 4 7 4 112 549 1 2 3
13 EBN is too dry and may crack 3 7 4 84 532 1 2 4
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4.3.3 Risk interval and the risk ordering analysis
Table 7 summarizes the risk intervals and risk ordering
analyses of failure modes. Column ‘‘q’’ is the vigilance
parameter setting of fuzzy ART. Column ‘‘RPN model’’ is
the RPN model used for risk evaluation. Column
‘‘RPNz ¼ RPNz;RPNz
h i
’’ shows the risk interval for each
group of failure modes. Column ‘‘risk ordering analysis’’
shows risk ordering of different failure groups. As an
example, when q = 0.7, there is only one failure group.
With the traditional RPN and FIS-based RPN models, the
risk intervals for RPN1 are [30, 128] and [339, 591],
respectively.
When q = 0.9, there are three failure groups and their
risk intervals are [30, 40], [84, 128], and [48, 48],
respectively, with the traditional RPN model. From the risk
intervals, it can be observed that RPN1 \ RPN3 \ RPN2.
This implies that the degree of risk associated with the
second group is higher than that of the third, which is
followed by the first group. Using the FIS-based RPN
model, the risk intervals are [422, 465], [532, 591], and
[339, 339], respectively. A different risk ordering is
obtained, i.e., RPN3 \ RPN1 \ RPN2. This is because
different RPN models produce different RPN values.
Group 1 consists of three potential failures (k = 1, 3, 4),
and group 3 consists of one potential failure (k = 2). It can
be observed that group 1 consists of failures with higher
O scores (i.e., 9 or 10, which implies once within 1–8 h or
many times in an hour, see Table 3) than that of group 3
(i.e., 6, which implies at least once within 1–30 days). All
potential failures in both groups 1 and 3 have very good
D scores, i.e., 1 or 2, which implies good detection actions
and prevention measures are available. Even though
potential failures in group 1 has better D score (i.e., 1) than
that of group 3 (i.e., 2), the detection actions are still
excellent and effective (see Table 4). Therefore, based on
the feedback and opinions from domain experts, the risk of
group 1 should be higher than that of group 3, owing to its
O scores. For group 2, both the RPN and FIS-based RPN
models suggest that its potential failures have the highest
risk.
When q = 0.95, there are five failure groups. With the
traditional RPN model, it can be observed that RPN1,
RPN2 \ RPN5 \ RPN4 \ RPN3, and RPN1 2 RPN2.
Again, with the FIS-based RPN model, a different risk
ordering is obtained, i.e., RPN5 \ RPN1, RPN2 \
RPN4 \ RPN3. Based on the above-mentioned reasons,
feedback and opinions from domain experts suggest that
the risk of groups 1 and 2 should be higher than that of
group 5. Both the RPN and FIS-based RPN models suggest
that the potential failures in group 3 have the highest risk,
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In short, the proposed risk interval and risk ordering
analysis allow different failure groups to be ranked and
analyzed. The outcome of the analysis is dependent on the
RPN model used. The empirical results show that the FIS-
based RPN model is able to produce a better risk ordering
than that of the traditional RPN model.
4.3.4 Remarks
The applicability of an incremental-learning clustering
technique (i.e., fuzzy ART [20]) for analysis of failure
modes in FMEA has been demonstrated. Fuzzy ART is
capable of rapid and stable learning of recognition cate-
gories in response to arbitrary sequences of failure modes
[20]. Besides that, its incremental-learning feature [20]
allows new failure modes to be included and analyzed from
time to time. However, it is not guaranteed that fuzzy ART
will always provide an optimal clustering outcome.
5 Summary
In this paper, the use of fuzzy ART for clustering failure
modes in FMEA has been investigated. Three new con-
cepts in FMEA have been proposed. First, the new
Euclidean distance-based similarity measure allows the
similarity of failure modes to be quantified. Next, fuzzy
ART allows failure modes in FMEA to be clustered into
different groups effectively, even if a new failure
mode(s) is included. Then, the risk interval measure allows
the risks associated with failure mode groups to be
obtained and ordered. The usefulness of these proposed
concepts have been demonstrated using real data and
information gathered from the EBN industry in Sarawak
[11]. Positive results have been obtained. The results have
also been properly analyzed and discussed. The outcomes
are in line with the opinions of the domain experts. For
further work, visualization of failure modes in FMEA using
a self-organizing map [29] and an evolving tree [30, 31]
will be investigated. Besides that, the use of clustering and
visualization techniques in other decision-making and
assessment problems, e.g., education assessment [32], will
be further examined.
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